[LRTW] 1/2 & 1/9 final AO presentations

Important notes:

  • We will meet at 1 PM as usual, and conclude (hopefully) by 6 PM this week, and earlier next week.
  • As a presenter, you are expected to present your arguments anew, as in a conference; in other words, pretend we haven’t heard them before.
  • As a reviewer, you are expected to review the logical coherence of the arguments, the format of cited resources, and presentation performance.
  • All are expected to read everyone else’s AO, in addition to the one you review. This is your last chance to shore up your participation score.
  • Learn to take good control of your time. Highlight your main arguments when time is short, and elaborate when time permits.
  • Each session lasts 1 hr. (see time allocation table below).

Order of Presentations & Presenter-reviewer (red) Pairing:

  • The order and pairing have been decided by a series of random draws (conducted by a secret guest) under the following guidelines:
  1. All AOs by ILG (法政所) students will be reviewed by IIE (產經所) students, and vice versa (with one exception for the apparent reason that the IIE group has one more member).
  2. All presenters this week will be reviewers next week (again, with one exception).
order presenter reviewer
week 1
1 吳啟豪 陳宛渝
2 潘書嫺 黃中麟
3 盧藝汎 陳珮文
4 陳宛渝 楊岱欣
5 李路宣 黃宇良
week 2
6 陳珮文 李路宣
7 黃宇良 盧藝汎
8 黃中麟 吳啟豪
9 楊岱欣 潘書嫺

Time Allocation:

presentation 20 min.
review 8 min.
open discussion 12 min.
author’s final response 5 min.
moderator’s time 10 min.

[Antitrust] 12/11 Market Interference: Trademark & Copyright Issues

Mandatory:

  • Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir., 2007).
  • 智慧財產法院100年度行商訴字第104號判決 (嬌蕉包案) (上訴經最高行政法院101年度裁字第391號裁定駁回)。

Additional:

  • The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006.
  • Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
  • 王敏銓,從維多利亞秘密案看美國聯邦商標淡化法,收錄於焦興鎧主編,美國最高法院重要判決之研究,2000-2003,頁235 (2007)。
  • KP Permanent Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
  • Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012).
  • Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (Search in Westlaw by the citation “REST 3d UNCOM 1″, then click on the “Table of Contents” link on the left), in particular ch. 2 & 3.
  • Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768 (1979): Competition As Proper Or Improper Interference (Search in Westlaw by the citation “REST 2d TORTS 768″).
  • Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
  • Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 60 (2008).
  • Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
  • Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
  • Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (1988).
  • Lee v. A.R.T. Company, 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).

[Antitrust] 12/4 Price Discrimination

Mandatory:

  • Volvo Trucks North America v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006).

Additional:

[Antitrust] 11/27 Mergers & Acquisitions

Mandatory:

Additional:

  • German Federal Cartel Office, Guidance on Substantive Merger Control (2012).
  • United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U. S. 486 (1974).
  • FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
  • Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
  • FTC  v. Whole Foods Market, 548 F.3d 1028 (2008).
  • Omnicare, Inc. v. Unitedhealth Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2011).

[Antitrust (Sat.)] Class Schedule Updated

Announcement (Correction made to reflect the correct special workday):

Due to the fact that 12/22 is a workday (to make up for the extra holiday on 12/31), the following adjustments have been made to our class schedule (special thanks to those few who stayed after class to advise me on the matter yesterday):

1. There will be no class on 12/22.

2. The remaining classes will be extended to make up for the last time, so be prepared to go home later for the rest of the semester.

3. the order of topics remains the same, but they have to be squeezed into 3 days.

Please see the updated schedule on our class homepage for detail, including adjusted presentation schedule. Let me know if there’s any problem.

[Antitrust] 10/30-11/06 Vertical Restraints

Mandatory:

  • Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
  • Randy D. Gordon, Framing Franchise Antitrust Litigation: The Legacy of Kodak and Queen City Pizza, 40 SW. L. REV. 247 (2010).

Additional:

  • Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) .
  • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
  • Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 129 F.3d 724 (3rd Cir. 1997).
  • Rick-Mik Enterprises v. Equilon Enterprises, 532 F.3d 963, (9th Cir., 2008).
  • LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
  • Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
  • State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
  • Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
  • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
  • Xerox, 203 F3d 1322 (Fed Cir 2000).
  • Microsoft 2001, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
  • Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 Yale L. J. 950 (1968).
  • Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Why an Original Can be Better Than a Copy: Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation,  9 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 143 (2001) (the Westlaw ver. omitted tables, so you may want to try SSRN instead).
  • Constance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse Possession for Intellectual Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept to Resolve Conflicts Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws in the Information Age, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 327 (2003).
  • Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free Riding, 76 Antitrust L.J. 431 (2009).
  • John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition, 9 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 370 (2007).
  • Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 111 (1996).
  • Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (1985).

[Antitrust] 10/16-10/23 Horizontal Restraints

Mandatory reading:

  • Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir., 2005).
  • Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 70 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2002). (Part I to III.)

Additional reading:

  • Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965) and 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966).
  • Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 807 (1993).
  • Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 Antitrust L.J. 579 (1993).
  • Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
  • Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
  • NCAA v. University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
  • Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
  • FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
  • California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
  • American Needle v. National Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010).

[Antitrust] 9/25 – 10/9 Monopoly Power & Market Definition

Mandatory reading:

Additional reading:

  • Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
  • Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U. S. 585 (1985).
  • Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
  • Mark a. Lemley & Mark P. Mckenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 Geo. L.J. 2055 (2012).
  • Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
  • 76 Antitrust L.J. xxx, Symposium: Issues at the Forefront of Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance (2010).
  • 73 Antitrust L.J. xxx, Symposium–Aspen Skiing 20 Years Later (2005).
  • Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 (2000).
  • Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1999).