Antitrust

[Antitrust] 1/15-16 Final Paper Workshop

Class meeting time: 10:00

Important notes:

  • The order of presentations will be decided by drawing when we meet.
  • The reviewer is expected to examine the research question, the assumptions, and the logical connections of the arguments, as well as checking the citations, among other things.
  • All are expected to read everyone else’s paper, in addition to the one you review. This is your last chance to shore up your participation score.
  • Learn to take good control of your time. Highlight your main arguments when time is short, and elaborate when time permits.
  • Each session lasts 1:30 or so. (see the time allocation table below).

Presenter-reviewer Pairing (but NOT the order of presentations):

presenter reviewer
祺潔 聖惠
語謙 幸萱
聖惠 聖倫
溓安 雅涵
雅涵 凱文
幸萱 語謙
凱文 祺潔
聖倫 溓安

Time Allocation:

presentation 30 min.
review 10 min.
open discussion 25 min.
author’s final response 10 min.
moderator’s time 15 min.
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LRTW

[LRTW] 1/3 Final AO presentations

Class meeting time: 10:00

Important notes:

  • As a presenter, you are expected to present your arguments anew, as in a conference; in other words, pretend we haven’t heard them before.
  • As a reviewer, you are expected to review the logical coherence of the arguments, the bluebooking of cited resources, and presentation performance.
  • All are expected to read everyone else’s AO, in addition to the one you review. This is your last chance to shore up your participation score.
  • Learn to take good control of your time (note the time is allocated differently from the other class). Highlight your main arguments when time is short, and elaborate when time permits.
  • Each session lasts roughly 1 hr. (see time allocation table below).

Order of Presentations: to be decided via lottery on site.

Pairing (not the order of presentations) :

presenter reviewer
咸蓁 雅涵
幸萱 聖倫
聖惠 幸萱
雅涵 聖惠
聖倫 咸蓁
Antitrust

[Antitrust] 11/21-28 Mergers & Acquisitions

 Mandatory:

Additional:

  • DOJ Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
  • German Federal Cartel Office, Guidance on Substantive Merger Control (2012).
  • United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U. S. 486 (1974).
  • FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
  • Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
  • FTC  v. Whole Foods Market, 548 F.3d 1028 (2008).
  • Omnicare, Inc. v. Unitedhealth Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2011).
Antitrust

[Antitrust] 11/14 Exclusionary Practices

Mandatory reading:

  • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

Additional reading:

  • Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
  • United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (2001).
  • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
  • Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
  • Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U. S. 585 (1985).
  • Bus. Electr. Corp. v. Sharp Electr. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
  • FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
  • Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
  • Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
  • Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
  • Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
  • Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1695 (2013).
  • Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2005).
  • Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 (2000).
  • Thomas A. Lambert, Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The “Exclusion of a Competitive Rival” Approach, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1175 (2014).
  • 73 Antitrust L.J. xxx, Symposium–Aspen Skiing 20 Years Later (2005).
  • Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 70 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2002).
  • Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 807 (1993).
  • Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1999).
  • Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
LRTW

[LRTW] 9/27 Major Resources for Legal Research

Exercises:

  • US v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).
  • David Eisenstadt, James Langenfeld, The Role of Economics in Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 28-SUM Antitrust 52 (2014).
  • Cellophane Fallacy case.
  • Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir., 2005).
  • 148 F.2d 416.
  • 148 F.2d at 421.
  • Charles Reich, The New Property (1964).
  • Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1961).
  • Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998).
  • Articles by Justice Sotomayor.
  • Articles citing Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
  • Articles citing Ely’s “Democracy and Distrust.”
  • Most recent article by Bill Simon of Columbia Law.
  • Articles published by Columbia Law School in the last 30 days.
  • 有關同性婚姻與多元家庭的文章。
  • 有關廢除死刑的文章。

Homework:

  • 研讀大法官釋字 748號解釋,並整理解釋理由與一個(部分)不同意見書之論點大綱.
Antitrust

[Antitrust] 10/3-31 Restraints of Trade

Mandatory reading:

  • Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
  • David Eisenstadt, James Langenfeld, The Role of Economics in Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 28-SUM Antitrust 52 (2014).
  • US v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).

Additional reading:

Horizontal Restraints Cases
  • F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
  • Realcomp II, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011).
  • American Needle v. National Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
  • Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir., 2005).
  • NCAA v. University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
  • Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
  • Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Vertical Restraints Cases
  • Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
  • State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
  • Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
  • Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
Articles
  • Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 79 Antitrust L.J. 713 (2014).
  • Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 24-SPG Antitrust 40 (2010).
  • Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 Antitrust L.J. 579 (1993).
  • Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 Yale L. J. 950 (1968).
  • Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965) and 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966).