Antitrust

[Antitrust] 11/21-28 Mergers & Acquisitions

 Mandatory:

Additional:

  • DOJ Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
  • German Federal Cartel Office, Guidance on Substantive Merger Control (2012).
  • United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U. S. 486 (1974).
  • FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
  • Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
  • FTC  v. Whole Foods Market, 548 F.3d 1028 (2008).
  • Omnicare, Inc. v. Unitedhealth Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Antitrust

[Antitrust] 11/14 Exclusionary Practices

Mandatory reading:

  • Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

Additional reading:

  • Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
  • United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (2001).
  • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
  • Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
  • Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U. S. 585 (1985).
  • Bus. Electr. Corp. v. Sharp Electr. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
  • FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
  • Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
  • Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
  • Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
  • Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
  • Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1695 (2013).
  • Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2005).
  • Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 (2000).
  • Thomas A. Lambert, Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The “Exclusion of a Competitive Rival” Approach, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1175 (2014).
  • 73 Antitrust L.J. xxx, Symposium–Aspen Skiing 20 Years Later (2005).
  • Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 70 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2002).
  • Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 807 (1993).
  • Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1999).
  • Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
LRTW

[LRTW] 9/27 Major Resources for Legal Research

Exercises:

  • US v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).
  • David Eisenstadt, James Langenfeld, The Role of Economics in Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 28-SUM Antitrust 52 (2014).
  • Cellophane Fallacy case.
  • Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir., 2005).
  • 148 F.2d 416.
  • 148 F.2d at 421.
  • Charles Reich, The New Property (1964).
  • Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1961).
  • Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998).
  • Articles by Justice Sotomayor.
  • Articles citing Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
  • Articles citing Ely’s “Democracy and Distrust.”
  • Most recent article by Bill Simon of Columbia Law.
  • Articles published by Columbia Law School in the last 30 days.
  • 有關同性婚姻與多元家庭的文章。
  • 有關廢除死刑的文章。

Homework:

  • 研讀大法官釋字 748號解釋,並整理解釋理由與一個(部分)不同意見書之論點大綱.
Antitrust

[Antitrust] 10/3-31 Restraints of Trade

Mandatory reading:

  • Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
  • David Eisenstadt, James Langenfeld, The Role of Economics in Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 28-SUM Antitrust 52 (2014).
  • US v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).

Additional reading:

Horizontal Restraints Cases
  • F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
  • Realcomp II, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011).
  • American Needle v. National Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
  • Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir., 2005).
  • NCAA v. University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
  • Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
  • Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Vertical Restraints Cases
  • Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
  • State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
  • Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
  • Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
Articles
  • Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 79 Antitrust L.J. 713 (2014).
  • Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 24-SPG Antitrust 40 (2010).
  • Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 Antitrust L.J. 579 (1993).
  • Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 Yale L. J. 950 (1968).
  • Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965) and 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966).
LRTW

[LRTW] 9-20 Thesis Construction

Homework

  • Read the opinion of the court in United States v. Grinnell Corp. (your antitrust law assignment), and write a 1-paragraph summary, in Chinese, of the facts (no more than 10 lines).
  • Write another summary of the court’s opinion in Part I (again, 1-paragraph, in Chinese, 10 lines or less).
  • Submit your summaries to the mailing list by the end of Sun. (9/17).
  • Prepare a 3-5 min. short talk, in English, commenting on the court’s opinion. (Feel free to take cues from the dissenting opinions.)
Antitrust

[Antitrust] 9/19-26 Market Definition & Market Power

Mandatory reading:

Additional reading:

  • Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
  • U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir.1945) (Part I & II, *421 – 439).
  • United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
  • Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (2010).
  • Mark a. Lemley & Mark P. Mckenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 Geo. L.J. 2055 (2012).
  • 76 Antitrust L.J. xxx, Symposium: Issues at the Forefront of Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance (2010).
  • Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 71 (2011).
Law & Economics

[lawecon] 6/22 Term paper presentations

Class meeting time: 10 am

Important notes:

  • The order of presentations will be decided by drawing at the beginning on Thursday.
  • The reviewer is expected to examine the research questions, the assumptions (explicit or hidden), the analytical models of the paper, as well as the strength and weakness of its arguments. You’re the reviewer; be critical.
  • The reviewer should also look out for improper copy-pasting from other people’s works, inaccurate citations, and poor bluebooking jobs.
  • All are expected to read everyone else’s paper, in addition to the one you review. This is your last chance to shore up your participation score.
  • Learn to take good control of your time. Highlight your main arguments when time is short, and elaborate when time permits.
  • Each session lasts 1:20 or so. (see the time allocation table below).

Order of Presentations: to be decided via lottery on site.

Pairing (not the order of presentations) :

presenter reviewer
乃云 惠暄
惠暄 凱心
羽芯 宇哲
凱心 羽芯
宇哲 乃云

Time Allocation:

presentation 25 min.
review 10 min.
open discussion 15 min.
author’s final response 10 min.
moderator’s time 15 min.