Law & Economics

[lawecon] 5/17 Criticisms and the Behavioral Approach


  • Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).


  • Margaret Jane Radin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas O’fallon Memorial Lecture on Reconsidering Personhood, 74 Or. L. Rev. 423 (1995).
  • Articles in Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein, Ed., 2000).

[Antitrust] 1/15 Paper Presentations

Class meeting time: 9:00

Important notes:

  • The order of presentations will be decided by drawing when we meet.
  • The reviewer is expected to examine the research question, the assumptions, and the logical connections of the arguments, as well as checking the citations, among other things.
  • All are expected to read everyone else’s paper, in addition to the one you review. This is your last chance to shore up your participation score.
  • Learn to take good control of your time. Highlight your main arguments when time is short, and elaborate when time permits.
  • Each session lasts 1:30 or so. (see the time allocation table below).

Presenter-reviewer Pairing (but NOT the order of presentations):

presenter reviewer
凱心 宇哲
惠暄 羅嵐
羽芯 惠暄
宇哲 羽芯
乃云 凱心
羅嵐 乃云

Time Allocation:

presentation 30 min.
review 10 min.
open discussion 25 min.
author’s final response 10 min.
moderator’s time 15 min.

[LRTW] Final AO presentations

Class meeting time:

  • 12:30 (Fri.): 11am
  • 1/9 (Mon.): 10am

Important notes:

  • As a presenter, you are expected to present your arguments anew, as in a conference; in other words, pretend we haven’t heard them before.
  • As a reviewer, you are expected to review the logical coherence of the arguments, the bluebooking of cited resources, and presentation performance.
  • All are expected to read everyone else’s AO, in addition to the one you review. This is your last chance to shore up your participation score.
  • Learn to take good control of your time (note the time is allocated differently from the other class). Highlight your main arguments when time is short, and elaborate when time permits.
  • Each session lasts roughly 1 hr. (see time allocation table below).

Order of Presentations: to be decided via lottery on site.

Pairing (not the order of presentations) :

presenter reviewer
之穎 子楠
子楠 羽芯
惠暄 宇哲
乃云 凱心
凱心 乃云
宇哲 惠暄
羽芯 之穎

Time Allocation:

presentation 20 min.
review 10 min.
open discussion 15 min.
author’s final response 5 min.
moderator’s time 10 min.

[Antitrust] 12/13 False Advertising


  • POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).


  • Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
  • Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
  • FTC, Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 CFR Part 255 (2009) and the 2010 Q&A.
  • FTC Advertising FAQ’s: A Guide for Small Business (PDF version).
  • Michael D. Scott, FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 127 (2008).
  • Thomas W. Edman, Note, Lies, Damn Lies, and Misleading Advertising: The Role of Consumer Surveys in the Wake of Mead Johnson v. Abbott Labs, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 417 (2001).
  • Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories, 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 209 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2000).
  • Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986).

[Antitrust] 11/29 Mergers & Acquisitions



  • DOJ Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
  • German Federal Cartel Office, Guidance on Substantive Merger Control (2012).
  • United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U. S. 486 (1974).
  • FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
  • Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
  • FTC  v. Whole Foods Market, 548 F.3d 1028 (2008).
  • Omnicare, Inc. v. Unitedhealth Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2011).

[Antitrust] 11/22 Exclusionary Practices

Mandatory reading:
  • Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).

Additional reading:

  • Bus. Electr. Corp. v. Sharp Electr. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)
  • FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
  • Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
  • Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
  • Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
  • Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U. S. 585 (1985).
  • Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
  • Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1695 (2013).
  • Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2005).
  • Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 (2000).
  • Thomas A. Lambert, Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The “Exclusion of a Competitive Rival” Approach, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1175 (2014).
  • 73 Antitrust L.J. xxx, Symposium–Aspen Skiing 20 Years Later (2005).
  • Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 70 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2002).
  • Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 807 (1993).
  • Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1999).